MIT economist Andrew Lo had published a paper where he reviews twenty one (yes, 21) books about the global financial crisis. In search of common explanations and themes, he found confusion instead. “After each book, I felt like I knew less. For an academic, that’s a pretty frustrating feeling.”
Very interesting Economist article on the roots of China’s success – and why China must change to achieve future prosperity. However, the “China Unbalanced” debate is far from over, and countless arguments have been laid out for each side of the debate. Why does it matter to us? Surely, as Brazilians, because of the undeniable impact of China in our economy. But more importantly, as global citizens and asset managers, because of the uncertainty that comes from such a wide range of possible outcomes.
We’re still digesting the MF Global collapse, and we’re guessing it will be the case study for the intersection of risk management and culture/ incentive systems – not that it could ever be separated, but this was the case that really drove it home because of the inconceivable use of client funds… We highlight several articles on counterparty risk, fraud and MF Global inside.
It would be easy to dismiss anything coming from Citigroup, not exactly the bastion of sound risk management practices. And it does appear like Vikram Pandit’s main suggestion here is, at first glance, simplistic yet hard to implement. Anyway, moves in the right direction are welcome, but on risk management issues, we tend to defer to Taleb (new talk inside).
Just as in our September 2011 post called “How to spot a fraud”, a Wall Street Journal piece tells another story about returns that look too good to be true – but in this case, “too good” means “low volatility”. The point here is the ages-old trap of equating “risk” with “volatility” and assuming that a low-volatility fund is less risky. Even ignoring the possibility of fraud, it’s a bad move.
Great thought-provoking article, called “The Dumbest Idea In The World: Maximizing Shareholder Value”, sent by our most loyal reader. As the sender himself said, the discussion isn’t new but it’s always interesting. The real point of it is the power of incentives. The “too-simple” conclusion would be that “the road to hell is paved with good intentions” – but that would be wrong.
We were initially skeptical because, as Buysiders.com readers are probably well aware by now, we view risk management as a matter of knowledge gathering/sharing and corporate culture. The excerpts inside this post explain our satisfaction with the video. It’s not enough for us to judge whether this course is a great investment for you or your company, but we have attended classes with Bob Kaplan (and other) at Harvard and we certainly got more than our money’s worth.
Two recent stories in US newspapers highlight the huge per-capita spending of Brazilians in the US. While one piece focuses on tourists in NY and retail sales, the other focuses on Florida and also mentions Brazilians buying up real estate. The big point: the taxation making imports so expensive in Brazil as to justify, in some cases, the airfare and hotel expenses.
We continue to learn from the collapse of Jon Corzine’s MF Global. A recent article at NYT’s Dealbook highlights another lesson: ignore your chief risk or compliance officer at your own peril. While we agree that in this case it might have led to different and better decisions, such officers are still prone to all the talent, behavioral and incentives-driven traps and pitfalls. That said, the simple governance, hierarchical and process improvements the author suggests do help, and he also has the merit of recognizing that “Leadership has the right to challenge, disagree or even reject that advice.” Remember: “Culture eats Strategy for breakfast”.
“A catalogue of disastrous decisions”: that’s the title of a story today in the Financial Times about the many failures in the downfall of the Royal Bank of Scotland. More specifically, the author recommends the chapter on “Management, governance and culture” in the FSA’s report about that bank’s failure. In the face of it, the board looked knowledgeable and transparent, and the CEO didn’t look too dominant. And yet the company went bust despite the fact that the “checklist” seemingly gave the “right” answers…
